The AOUSC statement is short and clear. BAE Systems IT and websites that support BNC operations were hit. BAE runs those systems and sites for the judiciary. Access is down to bnc.uscourts.gov, bankruptcynotices.uscourts.gov, notices.uscourts.gov, and the National Creditor Registration Service. The noticing process itself is unavailable.
How long. The Eastern District of Texas said Wednesday that the Administrative Office advised courts the disruption began Oct 9, 2026. That district entered general orders extending certain deadlines tied to the outage. Filings, case openings, and CM/ECF document processing continue, but entry and service of notices and orders, including 341 notices, may be delayed until BNC is restored.
What BAE says. A BAE spokesperson told The Record the company is “aware of a security incident that is isolated to the BNC system” and has “taken immediate steps to address it,” while coordinating with AOUSC. No restore timeline was published. Root cause: Undisclosed. Whether notice data or creditor registries were accessed or taken: Undisclosed.
Why this matters outside the courthouse. BNC is the national pipe for electronic and paper bankruptcy notices. When one contractor’s stack goes dark, every district feels it at once. Creditor matrices through BNC are impaired, which is why Texas Eastern published a CM/ECF Query workaround for counsel who still need to serve parties by hand.
What we’d do tomorrow morning. If you run legal ops or creditor rights, assume delayed service and check local general orders before you miss a clock. If you buy critical court, filing, or regulated-notice infrastructure from a single vendor, treat this as the tabletop: how long can you operate on manual service, who declares the failover, and who owns the restore SLA. If you are BAE or any peer contractor on judiciary systems, pull the same playbook you use for a customer-facing SaaS outage — isolate, preserve evidence, and publish a restore clock even when the root cause stays Undisclosed.