Supply chain · Breaking

Attackers poisoned Optimizely snippets on 178 brands' sites, including Zoom, CNN, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab and HSBC, serving a card skimmer, crypto-wallet swapper and iPhone exploit kits

On Nov 16 an attacker wrote malicious code into the Optimizely Web projects of at least 178 organizations, so the trusted snippet those sites load from cdn.optimizely.com served visitors a crypto-address swapper, a payment-card skimmer, cookie and screenshot theft, and iOS exploit kits. Report URI (Scott Helme) found the code in 188 of 1,611 snippets it checked; BleepingComputer confirmed it loading on Zoom, CNN, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab and others. Most copies were cleaned within a day. How the attacker got write access to so many customer projects is not yet known, and Optimizely has not commented.

Nov 16, 2026 · 3 min read

What happened. Optimizely Web is an A/B-testing tool: each customer site loads a JavaScript file, the snippet, from Optimizely's CDN on every page. The snippet includes a field called Project JavaScript, custom code the customer writes in the Optimizely dashboard. According to Report URI, the attacker wrote their own loader into that field in customer projects and left the rest of each snippet alone. So the file still came from cdn.optimizely.com, a host every affected site already trusted. Report URI saw the earliest hijacks early on Nov 16.

Who was hit. Report URI, security researcher Scott Helme's company, found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it analyzed, belonging to 178 organizations, and says the real number is likely higher. BleepingComputer independently confirmed through urlscan.io scans that the script loaded or tried to load on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, BBC, CNN, Smartsheet, Stamps.com and Salesforce. Other named sites include Fox News, HSBC Insurance, Air France, Bitly and IG. Optimizely's own websites carried the code too.

What the code did. The loader pulled a script called track.js from 1688360[.]cc. Some copies hid that address in Base64, and one variant carried the full payload inline in case the server was blocked. The payload swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs typed into a site's own form fields, grabbed readable cookies and page screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Cards typed into hosted payment fields such as Stripe's or Adyen's were out of its reach, per Report URI. The attacker's wallets took in about $7,000 on Nov 16. Nobody outside the attacker knows how many cards or cookies were stolen.

Status. After a mass cleanup, Report URI found only one of the 188 snippets still infected at 21:52 UTC on Nov 16. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then reinfected, which Report URI says shows the attacker still had access at the time. Update Nov 17: Optimizely told BleepingComputer an unauthorized party "exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow" to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. It says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts, blocked code delivery at Cloudflare and notified all affected customers. It has not said how many customers were hit or how long the flaw was open. Updates go to status.optimizely.com.

Why it matters. This is a Magecart-style skimmer at a scale no single site breach could reach. One write path into a third-party script reached banks, airlines, SaaS vendors and newsrooms at once. Every tag-manager, analytics and testing script on a checkout or login page has this same power over your page.

Defender move. If you use Optimizely Web, open every project's Project JavaScript and look for 1688360[.]cc or atob() loaders, check the change history for Nov 16, and rotate Optimizely user passwords, SSO sessions and API tokens. Keep third-party scripts off payment and login pages where you can, use hosted payment fields, and set a Content Security Policy that only allows the domains your scripts actually need, so a hijacked script can't call home.

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