What happened. Transport for London (TfL), which runs London’s Tube, buses and fare systems, says the personal details of about 265,000 Oyster photocard customers were accessed in a cyber breach. Photocards are the discounted travel cards for children, students, apprentices, veterans and over-60s. TfL spotted the problem on Monday, Nov 16, when customers who already had photocard accounts started getting emails asking them to create an account. It took the photocard website offline the same day and began notifying affected people on Wednesday, Nov 18.
What was taken. According to TfL’s notice, the exposed data includes names, email and home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, and security questions and answers. TfL says its first review shows no passwords, bank or payment card details, or journey history were compromised, and that the names and birth dates of children on Zip Oyster cards were not affected. TfL has not said who was behind it or exactly how the attackers got in, and no group has publicly claimed it.
What TfL says. “We immediately took the TfL photocard website down while this was being investigated,” said Shashi Verma, TfL’s director of technology strategy and revenue, who apologized to customers. TfL has reported the incident to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the UK data regulator. Photocards still work for travel, but customers cannot apply for or renew one online until the site is back.
Second time. This is the second time in just over two years the photocard system has been taken down after a cyber incident. In September 2024 an attack on TfL froze new photocard applications for more than two months. TfL said then that about 5,000 customers were contacted over possible access to bank details; the BBC later reported data on about 10 million people was stolen. The ICO cleared TfL of wrongdoing over that breach.
Why it matters. Security questions and answers are the real problem here. Unlike a password, you can’t easily change your mother’s maiden name or first school, and the same answers are often reused to reset bank, telecom and email accounts. Pair those with a full name, home address and birth date, and you have a starter kit for account takeover and very convincing phishing.
Defender takeaway. Treat leaked security answers like leaked passwords: anything that still lets a user reset an account with a knowledge question should move to app-based or passkey recovery. For help desks, expect callers who know a customer’s birth date, address and security answer, and don’t accept that as proof of identity. Worth asking your team: how many of our own account-recovery flows still trust a security question?
